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Notes and Comments
Alec Samuels* Acquittal of the Guilty
Every acquittal is an injustice. Either a guilty man has escaped
conviction, or an innocent man has been subjected to false
accusation, with all the accompanying worry, anxiety, publicity,
humiliation, perhaps detention, probably expense.
Some of the difficulties undoubtedly spring from the adversary
system, a system evolved in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
to meet the then contemporary problems. It is a system with certain
inherent inefficiencies and ineffectivenesses, a system designed to
ascertain whether the prosecution has proved an allegation against D
the defendant beyond all reasonable doubt and not designed to
ascertain the truth of the incident in issue. The question is not: What
happened? Who did it? The question is: Has it been proved that D
did it? Guilty or not guilty?
Protagonists of the present system point to the fact that notorious
professional criminals such as the Krays and the Richardsons have
been convicted and sentenced, while critics point out that the Krays
were previously acquitted on a protection racket charge and were
able to terrorise large areas of London for a considerable period
before being finally brought to justice.
The police labour under considerable handicaps. They have no
right to insist upon an answer to a question. The administration of
the caution may induce a criminal to rely upon his strict legal rights,
e.g., the right to remain silent. Confessions are not infrequently
retracted or denied at the trial and unpleasant allegations are made
against the police at the trial within a trial. The law of evidence,
especially admissibility, is complicated and difficult, e.g., in regard
to previous convictions. The law of corroboration is unclear. The
substantive criminal law leaves a good deal to be desired.
Those who advocate changes in the system, principally with the
object of making the conviction of the guilty less difficult, have
suggested the abolition of the right of silence on arrest and at the
trial, perhaps subject to safeguards; pre-trial disclosure of defence;
admissibility of previous convictions; as well as more liberal or
*Alec Samuels, J.P., Barrister, Reader in Law, University of Southampton
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relaxed rules of evidence, especially the abolition of the hearsay
rule.
In England the current rate of acquittal in contested cases in the
crown courts, i.e. serious cases heard on indictment before the jury,
is running at between one third and one half', though an acquittal rate
must be seen in the context of a situation in which the vast majority
of defendants plead guilty.
The meaning of acquittal is open to argument and it is important
to define terms. Where there are two or more charges (quite
common in the crown courts) the defendant may successfully plead
not guilty to all the charges or may enter a mixed plea (guilty to
some of the charges, not guilty to others). Then the success in the
not guilty plea may be attributable to the action of the prosecution,
withdrawing the charge or offering no evidence; or of the judge,
directing an acquittal because of insufficient evidence as a matter of
law to justify conviction, or judicial approval of acceptance by the
prosecution of plea of guilty to lesser charge or as a result of the
verdict of the jury on another charge; or of the jury, giving a not
guilty verdict following a full trial. Incidentally, conviction on the
so-called lesser charge can be a very serious matter; in mixed plea
the prosecution could, for example, accept a not guilty plea to
attempted murder and a guilty plea to causing grievous bodily harm
with intent (maximum penalty life imprisonment). So, acquittal can
mean "going down" (being convicted) on a lesser charge. It can
also mean that the case does not get to the jury at all, and finally, it
may mean a verdict by the jury of not guilty leaving the defendant a
free man without a stain on his character.
2
However, the fact that a high proportion of charges of serious
crime do not result in conviction has given rise to considerable
disquiet, criticism, inquiry and discussion into the system of trial.
Conversely, a very low rate of acquittal, if such were the case,
would also give rise to concern. In a famous lecture, the Dimbleby
Lecture 1973, Sir Robert Mark, Commissioner of the Metropolitan
1. Some acquittal figures are given in Sir Robert Mark and Peter Scott, The
Disease of Crime: Punishment or Treatment? (Edwin Stevens Lectures for the
Laity, 1972) (London: Royal Society of Medicine, 1972), Appendix at 19-22. See
also Nigel Walker, Crimes, Courts and Figures (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1971)
at 46; Trial by Jury (1966), 116 N.L.J. 928; S. Elgrod and J. Lew, Acquittals - A
Statistical Exercise (1973), 123 N.L.J. 1104. The published studies are all
conveniently summarized and discussed in Michael Zander, Acquittal Rates and
Not Guilty Pleas: What Do the Statistics Mean?, [1974] Crim. L.R. 401.
2. These distinctions were brought out clearly by Zander, id.
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Police in London, stated that in his opinion the situation is
unacceptable.
3
A prosecution is not brought unless there is a considerable body
of evidence. What then is the explanation for the apparently high
rate of acquittal? Sir Robert Mark suggested that the exclusionary
rules of evidence, the plausible false story put forward by the
defendant, the persuasive advocate, the direction of the judge, the
thin case committed for trial "on the papers" without sufficient
investigation, and the "perverse" jury4 may all be contributing
factors.
Michael Zander5 summarised his findings on the reasons for
acquittals as follows:
Up to about one third of all acquittals are the result of
directions from the judge.
Preverse jury decisions account for between 6 per cent and 9
per cent of the total acquittals.
The remainder of acquittals are accounted for by a whole
variety of factors - such as failure of prosecution witnesses
to turn up or to come up to proof; the bad impression created
by prosecution witnesses; general weakness of the prosecu-
tion case; sympathy for the defendant; lack of sympathy for
the law under which he is charged; reaction against the
judge's handling of the case; belief in the defendant's
innocence; acceptance of the defendant's defence; or simply
the feeling that the prosecution case has not been proved
beyond a reasonable doubt.
Acquittals often occurred in the comparatively minor cases,
although even in the crown court there are still today a
predominance of comparatively minor cases in the court list.
The Zander thesis takes the professional criminal as the defendant
charged with the major, serious or heavy offences or with the most
criminal convictions, 6 a somewhat arbitrary approach, because the
legal description of a criminal situation may be very misleading,
e.g. robbery or conspiracy. The seriousness of a crime is subject to
3. (1973), 90 The Listener 613 (8th November) at 615. (Also printed separately by
the B.B.C.):"
4. Id.
5. Michael Zander, Are Too Many Professional Criminals Avoiding Conviction? A
Study in Britain's Two Busiest Courts (1974), 37 Mod. L. Rev. 28 at 58.
6. Id. at 33-5.
246 The Dalhousie Law Journal
subjective evaluation. It should also be remembered that the
inadequate recidivist criminal has a long list of convictions
compared with the highly skilled professional criminal who cleverly
avoids detention and arrest. Furthermore, the professional criminal
is not necessarily a full time or regular "worker"; his criminal
activities are often irregular (perhaps because the rewards are good)
and a lawful, normal and innocent "front" activity is clearly wise.
The reasons for the acquittal are often based upon the judgment of
the lawyers involved, a judgment not to be despised, but one not
necessarily cognizant of the whole story. Lawyers tend to detach
themselves from too readily forming guilt or innocence type of
appraisals.
Mark Carlisle Q.C. 7 puts the point clearly:
Indeed it might be argued that the more sophisticated the criminal
the less likely he is to have a previous criminal record, and it is, I
think, fallacious though tempting to suggest that, of those who
come before the courts, the sophisticated or professional
criminals can be picked out on the basis of their previous criminal
record or lack of it. After all, was not Al Capone convicted only
of one offence and that what one might term a technical offence?
A comparison between the Mark thesis and the Zander thesis is
interesting. Neither thesis is based on any first hand research into
the jury itself. Both agree that about a third of acquittals are
attributable to the direction of the judge, frequently because the case
has been carelessly committed on the papers and should never have
been brought. Both seem to recognize the existence of the perverse
verdict, but as a comparatively infrequent phenomenon. The fresh,
new, or inexperienced jury seems readier to grant an acquittal.
Zander offers many other reasons for acquittals.
(1) The witness does not turn up. This may be the result of
insufficient vigilance by the prosecution - a situation
which could and should be remedied - or it may be
attributable to corruption by the defence.
(2) The witness does not come up to proof. Although minor
discrepancies in succeeding narratives are inevitable, a
substantial change on an important issue usually occurs only
if the witness has been corrupted.
(3) The prosecution witnesses create a bad impression. This
may be expected if these witnesses are criminals or their
7. Mark Carlisle, The Criminal Law Revision Committee's Report on Evidence
(1973), 12 J.S.P.T.L. 224 at 232.
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confederates; however, honest witnesses - police officers
or ordinary reputable people - may create such an
impression through arrogance, inaccuracy or uncertainty.
There is also the situation in which an element of perversity
seems to exist on the part of the jury.
(4) The case is generally weak. This indicates poor preparation
and/or presentation - faults which can and should be
corrected.
(5) Sympathy exists for the defendant. This should hardly be a
relevant factor in determining liability.
(6) There is a lack of sympathy for the law. The jury ought to
act as a barrier against arbitrary and oppressive laws and
prosecutions; however, the modem juror's lack of sympathy
for, say, the motoring laws, is neither commendable nor
responsible.
(7) There is a reaction against the judge. Though not infallible,
judges are likely to be experienced and impartial; reaction
against them, unless for some exceptional reason, seems
irrational and perverse.
(8) The jury believes the defendant to be innocent. This is fair
enough.
(9) The jury accepts the defendant's defence. Zander appar-
ently distinguishes this from #8. Nonetheless, it could be a
false and surprise defence.
(10) The prosecution fails to prove the case beyond reasonable
doubt. This is also fair - but it should be remembered that
a false and surprise defence could create doubts.
Having committed himself to the reasons for acquittal, Zander is
inevitably unable to say what if any effect would result from any
change in the existing rules; for example, abolition of the right of
silence, before and at the trial, abolition or modification of the
hearsay rule, admissibility of previous convictions, because his
thesis is that existing rules on these matters are immaterial in
promoting or securing the acquittal. 8 He ventures the opinion that
the admission of the previous convictions might cause a drastic
increase in convictions. 9
The suggested reasons given by Alec Muir'0 for acquittal in the
higher courts are:
(1) the defendant is pleading guilty to a lesser charge.
8. Supra, note 5 at 58-9.
9. Id. at 59.
10. Alec Muir, The Rules of the Game, [1973] Crim. L.R. 341 at 342.
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(2) the judge has decided that there is insufficient evidence to
sustain a particular charge.
(3) The defendant is not the principal offender but (possibly?)
associated with the principal offender.
(4) the line between a domestic dispute and a criminal offence
is blurred and indistinct and
(5) in the eyes of the jury the defendant is less to blame than his
"victim".
The Oxford study"' found that of the acquittals about 38 per cent
were policy cases, where the weight of the evidence was
inadequate, about 25 per cent were a real failure on the part of the
prosecution to prove the case (the witnesses did not come up to
proof), about 25 per cent the explanation by the defendant was
accepted (i.e. not rejected), and about 12 per cent the acquittal was
perverse in that a conviction was generally expected. The defence
very frequently admitted that the defendant was present, and did the
act, so the issue turned upon his intent. Experience and research
confirm this statement.
How far did the existing rules protect the guilty defendant, if
there was one? Would an adverse inference from silence on arrest or
silence in court by refusing to give evidence have changed the
result? Would the duty to disclose his defence in advance have
changed things? Would the admissibility of his previous convic-
tions, if any, have changed things? These are the imponderables
which research cannot answer very effectively.
Intimidation, which is effective, is by its very nature difficult to
establish. In England in 1967 the principle of majority verdict, 10 :
2 after at least two hours, was introduced because of widespread
police anxiety about intimidation of jurors. The prosecution witness
who changes his story or fails to appear at the trial might well have
been intimidated. Experience shows that ordinary people do not so
readily change their story or fail to turn up to a criminal court.
Recent English trials involving alleged I.R.A. killings and
bombings had to be held out of London and in conditions of
extremely tight security.
Sir Robert Mark, Micheal Zander and the Oxford study all seem
to agree upon the incidence of the directed verdict, and upon the
11. Sarah McCabe and Robert Purves, The Jury at Work (Oxford University Penal
Research Unit Occasional Paper No. 4) (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1971) at 38.
Table 3 on that page has been modified to exclude directed verdicts.
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principal reason, namely, the thin evidence because of committal for
trial on the papers. 12 The Oxford study draws particular attention to
the policy prosecution,1 3i.e. cases where the evidence was not very
strong but where the police felt justified in prosecuting for a policy
reason; for example, a prosecution of participants at a fight outside a
pub because this sort of thing was getting out of hand and publicity
for a police "crack down" might discourage such occurrences.
Another instance might be the prosecution of a defendant alleged to
have committed an offence against a coloured victim, because failure
to prosecute might be misinterpreted as racial discrimination. An
alleged thief or burglar might be prosecuted at the instigation of a
shopkeeper victim anxious to safeguard his insurance position.
Such is the pressure of work upon the prosecution that where two
defendants are charged arising out of the same matter (for instance,
a mother and son, or wife and husband are charged with shoplifting,
and son or husband pleads guilty and mother or wife pleads not
guilty) the prosecution are often willing to accept the not guilty
plea. A jury might be expected to sympathise with an older person,
or a woman, or someone likely to have played a subordinate role, or
to have been led into it. They may well accept the likely defence
that the son or husband was the only one criminally involved; this is
a line most likely to be taken by the son or husband pleading guilty
and hoping to find favour with the sentencing judge by accepting
responsibility and exonerating the other. It may also be difficult on
the evidence to prove satisfactorily that it was one rather than the
other, or both; this also leads to a likely acquittal.
The Unethical ["Bent"] Lawyer
The defence is conducted by a fearless independent advocate,
accustomed to appearing for both prosecution and defence, an
officer of the court, a professional person required to subscribe to
rigorous and exacting ethical standards, imposed and enforced by
professional disciplinary bodies. He must not put forward or suggest
any matter which he knows to be false; he must not mislead the
court; he must not put forward a witness as a witness of truth if he
knows him not to be; he must not run a defence he knows to be
12. Supra, note 3 at 615, note 5 at 44-8 and Sarah McCabe and Robert Purves,
By-passing the Jury: A Study of Changes of Plea and Directed Acquittals in Higher
Courts (Oxford University Penal Research Unit Occasional Paper No. 3) (Oxford:
Basil Blackwell, 1972) at 43-44.
13. Supra, note 11 at 12-26.
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false. Sir Robert Mark suggests that not all defence lawyers in fact
follow these standards. A minority of lawyers, unnamed and
unidentified, are "more harmful to society than the clients they
represent" 14 because, by improper means, they secure unjust
acquittals. They repeatedly run the same defence in which
prosecution witnesses suddenly and inexplicably change their
stories, concocted defences beyond the defendant's capacity are
offered, false alibis are given, and in cross examination damaging
and extraneous material is put to the police, e.g. perjury, planting
(drugs, explosives), intimidation, violence, suspension of a police
colleague. But the defendant with a criminal record must by very
careful in attacking the witnesses for the prosecution, even
justifiably, because then the prosecution can retaliate by revealing
his record. In "The Curious Case of the Bingo Register''15, a
lawyer was alleged to have taken a bingo register into the prison so
that the defendant in custody could sign his name as if he had signed
it on the day in question and thus provide himself with a false alibi.
However, professional disciplinary bodies cannot act without proof.
Unsupported allegations, however sincerely held, cannot constitute
proof; a just society cannot act without proof.
The Tolerant Jury
Why does the jury acquit when it does?' 6 Speaking from his
experience as a lawyer and trial judge Lord Salmon 17 suggests that
the jury does not accept as reliable the evidence called by the
prosecution, or the prosecution so overcomplicate the case that the
jury is "left in a fog", or the jury feels that the accused has been
treated unjustly in that the case against him has been unfairly
pressed by the prosecution or possibly by the judge.
It is the prerogative of a jury in very special circumstances to
come to the conclusion that although a man is technically guilty it
would not be fit and proper to convict him. '8
There has been no satisfactory investigation or research into jury
behaviour and acquittal; indeed, Sir Robert Mark has called the jury
14. Supra, note 3 at 616.
15. Id.
16. For the perverse jury, see Ely Devons, Serving as a Juryman in Britain (1965),
28 Mod. L. Rev. 561.
17. Lord Salmon,Are Too Many Guilty Acquitted? (1974), 124 N.L.J. 624 at 635.
18. Id.
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a "social institution which is protected from rational inquiry''19 .
Even the occupation of jurors is not now made known. A small
body of reasearch and general experience seem to suggest that the
jurors today are better educated, less ready to accept police
evidence, inclined to toleration (especially the younger jurors), and
likely to be against laws relating to motoring, tax, pornography, and
trade unions. As from 1 April 1974, The English jury has been
wholly "democratised", i.e. all registered electors 18 - 65,
irrespective of sex or property, are eligible. This has meant that the
average jury now consists of six women and one or two or even
three young people. The jury is probably capable of satisfactorily
determining a straight-forward issue of dishonesty in theft or
aggravated theft, and deliberate intention in assault or aggravated
assault, but probably incapable of determining a complicated fraud
case. Some sort of special jury might be more appropriate in a fraud
case, i.e. one containing accountants, professional and business
men. Even the "perverse" jury may be acting sensibly, e.g. the
ringleader was not prosecuted and the defendant played only a very
minor role, or there was impropriety of some kind somewhere along
the line, or the prosecution is in all the circumstances oppressive.
The ultimate safeguard of the twelve men and women and true, who
will not convict, is a precious safeguard not to be abandoned lightly.
The instinctive, unfavourable reaction of the jury to the prosecution
witness or to the judge strongly summing up for a conviction may be
the only protection against wrongful conviction.
Independent Prosecution Service
The duty of the police is to prevent, investigate, and detect crime.
The exercise of the discretion to prosecute and the preparation and
presentation of the case in court ought to be exercised by an
independent legal presecution service, a national DPP service, such
as is found in Scotland and now in Northern Ireland. Police are busy
enough with police duties. Police understandably feel a sense of
commitment to the case, to their belief in the guilt of the defendant,
and to the temptation to bend the rules because of the difficulty of
securing a conviction; whereas the lawyer can bring an independent
fresh appraisal of the strength or weakness of the prosecution
evidence and a more professional appraisal of the forensic
possibilities of the case. The public would feel a greater sense of
19. Supra, note 3 at 615.
252 The Dalhousie Law Journal
confidence in the system if the police were seen to be separated
from the prosecution process. The DPP should be better able to
present a strong case against the guilty; and to withdraw the case




No one seriously suggests that the prosecution should have the right
of appeal or retrial following an acquittal. The prosecution cannot
have the chance to repair a deficient case. This would be oppressive
for the defendant. In England the prosecution can appeal on a point
of law, but not so as to upset the sovereign verdict of acquittal
21
Northern Ireland
The terrible and tragic situation in Northern Ireland has resulted in
certain repercussions against the judicial system. An independent
legal prosecution service on Scottish lines has been introduced,
following the recommendations of Lord Hunt. Detention without
trial has taken place, a situation which has led the Republic of
Ireland to take the United Kingdom before the European
Commission on Human Rights. Certain minimum safeguards ought
to be provided even in terrorist emergency situations: the right to a
judicial hearing, to be presumed innocent, to be informed of the
charge, to receive legal aid, and to be cross examined. 22 The
political terrorist or urban guerilla presents a wholly new problem to
the criminal court system accustomed to dealing with the ordinary
non-political criminal, traditionally operating singly or in small
groups against property. By the Northern Ireland (Emergency
Provisions) Act 197323 a Commissioner may order detention of a
terrorist or suspected terrorist following a hearing. The hearing is in
private; the rules of evidence do not apply; the respondent may be
20. See The Prosecution Process in England and Wales (London: Justice
Educational and Research Trust, 1970).
21. See Alec Samuels, Miscellaneous Matters, [1973] Crim. L.R. 27 at 28-9 and
Criminal Justice Act (1972), 116 S.J. 931 and 953.
22. See Edmund McGovern, "Internment and Detention Without Trial in the
Light of the European Convention on Human Rights", in J.W. Bridge ed.,
FundamentalRights (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1973) at 219-3 1.
23. 1973, c. 53 (U.K.), s. 10(5) and Schedule 1. See also. Report of the
Commission to Consider Legal Procedures to Deal with Terrorist Activities in
Northern Ireland (The Diplock Commission Report) (1972), Cmnd. 5185).
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excluded on the grounds of public security or danger to the safety of
any person (e.g. a witness) though subsequently he must be
informed of the substance of the matters dealt with, and the
Commissioner may question the respondents (Schedule 1). Serious
offences, e.g. murder, manslaughter, arson, riot, criminal damage,
serious assualt, explosives, firearms, aggravated robbery and
aggravated burglary, are triable by judge alone (s.2(l) and Schedule
4).
Canada
L. P. de Grandpr6, former President of the Canadian Bar
Association and now a justice of the Supreme Court of Canada, has
called publicly for reform along the lines of the proposals of the
Criminal Law Revision Committee. He argues that the present rules
of evidence are too complicated, too tender to the criminal, and not
adequate protection for the innocent man.2 4 The rules emerged in
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries when circumstances were
very different; even the defendant was unrepresented, jurors
ignorant and prejudiced and penalties harsh. Today, virtually every
defendant in a serious criminal case is legally represented. The
jurors are educated, sophisticated people without knowledge of the
defendant. There is a proper appeal procedure available.
Grandpr6 urges the adoption of the principle that any evidence
relevant to truth should be admissible, so that weight, and not
admissibility should be the principal concern for the jury; it is also
suggested that the judge should retire with the jury to help them
evaluate the evidence.2 5 He urges the abolition of the right of
silence, the admissibility of confessions, the admissibility of
previous convictions - to be given at the beginning of the trial -
and, upon the establishment of a prima facie case by the
prosecution, the obligation upon the defendant to give evidence, on
oath, subject to cross-examination, refusal to do so entitling the jury
to draw an adverse inference if they so wish26. The Canadian rule
that a defendant may still be cross-exainined on his record has to
a considerable extent forced the defendant to remain out of the
witness box.
24. L. de Grandpr6, Criminals Coddled in Court, Canadian Bar Bulletin, May
1973 at3.
25. Id. at4.
26. Id. at 5.
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Reform
The law must endeavour to secure the right verdict. The defendant
must be convicted if the evidence proves guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, not otherwise. The balance between truth and justice must be
maintained, though the balance may properly be adjusted from time
to time. We must not oppress the suspect or accused. We must
protect the victims in society. What is needed is a review of criminal
procedure, preserving the traditional and tried virtues, affording
proper safeguards for the accused who may be innocent but at the
same time enabling the prosecution to discover and to present
relevant evidence to the court. It is not a matter of strengthening or
weakening the prosecution or defence, but giving both sides a fair
"crack of the whip". The position of both sides should be
improved. An independent prosecution service should be estab-
lished; greater judicial control should exist; there should be mutual
disclosure; rules for the admissibility of evidence ought to be more
liberal, and an adverse inference should be able to be drawn from a
failure to speak, provided proper safeguards are observed.
The establishment of an independent forensic laboratory whose
facilities and services would be available without discrimination to
all parties to a criminal case would assist in ascertaining the truth
through the latest scientific means.
The Right of Silence
The traditional right of silence should be retained. Not only is it an
integral part of the principle that the prosecution must prove its case
beyond a reasonable doubt, it is also widely understood that
alteration or elimination would be difficult.
There are a multitude of reasons for a suspect or arrested person
remaining silent. He might not appreciate what is relevant at the
trial. He may be overawed by the police. He may be trying to
protect someone else. He may wish to conceal other offences, or
behaviour which is disreputable though not illegal. He may be (and
may know it) a bad witness. He may be stupid and inarticulate. He
may be faced with clever or difficult questions he is unable to
answer. He may not say anything on a point because he is not asked.
He may be unaware of what is relevant if questions are too
wide-ranging.
The issues in a criminal case may be very complex. The police
may be tempted to suppress or not record what the accused actually
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did say. When a person is being closely questioned by the police, he
probably is a suspected person - a fact of which he is probably
aware. To decide whether on apprehension "he could reasonably
have been expected to mention" any matter would involve a trial
within a trial. And is this a subjective or objective test?
Is it suggested seriously that a person could be committed for trial
solely on the basis of his refusal to answer questions? "Anything
you do not say will be taken down and may be used in evidence
against you"! It is not enough to say that only "proper" inferences
may be drawn from silence, and that the judge will empathize with,
protect the accused, and direct the jury on the matter in a fair and
helpful way. Silence should never be sufficient as corroborative
evidence, a purely negative factor.
Presently, in practice, in England the accused usually gives
evidence at the trial for tactical reasons. But he may be a poor
witness, or have been involved in other offences, or be able by other
means to demolish the prosecution case (Dr. Bodkin Adams), and it
seems hard to draw an adverse inference in such circumstances. The
innocent may not wish to speak.
Certainly the accused should be required (as in Scotland and
some parts of the U.S.A.) to disclose his hand before the trial but
only after he has received a written formulation of the charge,
warning of the risk of adverse inference, and legal advice as well as
the statutory right to have a solicitor present when any defence
witness is interviewed by the police. What is called for is the
extension of the alibi procedure. The legal adviser would be most
unwise to advise his client to say nothing, except for very good
reason indeed, and an adverse inference should properly be drawn if
the jury so desire when no answer is given after proper safeguards
have been provided. At present, comment on the late appearance of
any defence is not uncommon and not improper. If a satisfactory
notice followed by disclosure procedure were introduced the present
unsatisfactory caution should be abolished. Sir Brian MacKenna
favours pretrial disclosure subject to safeguards.2 7 The burden of
proof should naturally remain on the prosecution throughout. The
right (so-called) of silence is not a necessary corollary of the rule
that the prosecution carry the burden of proof. There is presently
nothing to stop the jury from drawing an adverse inference from
silence by the defendant at any stage.
27. Sir Brian MacKenna, Criminal Law Revision Committee's Eleventh Report:
Some Comments, [1972] Crim. L.R. 605 at 616.
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The arguments for and against the right of silence have been
conducted at a very high qualitative level in Canada. 2 8 Those
favouring the right to silence say that the apparent crime explosion
is attributable principally to the population explosion, especially
among the under 30's, the increase in crime reporting, and the
economic ills of society. This group also claims that the
strengthening of the police and the improvement of the detection
rate is the way to convict criminals. As it is the prosecution already
enjoys very considerable advantages over the accused, in terms of
resources and scientific aid, and the balance should not be further
shifted, lest the protection of the innocent be jeopardised.
Those favouring the abolition of the right to silence point to the
crime wave and high level of acquittal and consequent police
frustration. Toughness is essential in such a situation. As Bentham
long ago pointed out, the right of silence is the first rule that the
criminal likes to see, and the sophisticated criminal avails himself to
it, and without an admission or confession the prosecution often
have no admissible evidence and cannot secure a conviction. The
honour of the legal profession may be damaged because of the
ethical dilemma presented to the lawyer advising a client whom he
knows or suspects to be guilty to exercise the right of silence and
thus hamper conviction. Civil law countries, which have crime
problems as well as a proper sense of justice, do not find a right of
silence necessary.
Interrogation
Some form of controlled interrogation is imperative. At present the
police are often accused of fabricating confessions, a generally
unfounded though annoying allegation; however, on the few
occasions when this is true, the accused has little protection. A
system of controlled interrogation, in the presence of a magistrate or
other independent third party, would protect the police from false
accusations and the accused from oppressive interrogation and
abuse. In such circumstances a confession might well be more
readily forthcoming; it would also be virtually incontrovertible. The
defence lawyer should be entitled to be present. Adverse inference
could be drawn from silence. An atmosphere of mistrust
28. See Edson Haines, Arthur Maloney and Paul Tomlinson, "Future of the Law
of Evidence - The Right to Remain Silent - Two Views" in R. Salhany and R.
Carter eds., Studies in Canadian Criminal Evidence (Toronto: Butterworths, 1972)
at 321-47.
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unfortunately now prevails in respect of police evidence and in
consequence perfectly true confessions are rejected by juries. In any
interrogation the suspect should be entitled by statute to have his
solicitor present. If the accused is prepared to make a statement it
would be desirable that he should write it in his own hand.
In the absence of a proper interrogation system the present rule
about the admissibility of confessions seems reasonably sound. The
CLRC proposals for two different sorts of confessions seem
unconvincing.2 9 There cannot be permissible and impermissible
threats.
Tape recording should be required and should be practicable in
most circumstances. Every police station and every police car could
easily be provided with an adequate supply of tape recorders.
However, there is a risk that the sophisticated criminal will say,
without justification, as soon as the tape recorder is turned on:
"Stop twisting my arm and hitting my face, you rotten copper."
Video-tape cannot be far off as a practicable possibility. Only the
limits of technology should limit the protection of the suspect.
There is no legal right in the police to detain on suspicion for
interrogation. The detainee often experiences considerable diffi-
culty in seeing a solicitor, because it is the middle of the night, or he
has no solicitor, or the police say that access to a solicitor would
unreasonably impede their enquiries, or the police simply refuse
access. Detention of the alleged IRA terrorists following the Old
Bailey bombs in 1973 for four days without access to an available
solicitor rightly caused very considerable adverse public comment.
The police should have the legal right to detain a person for a
reasonable period for interrogation, provided that proper protection
were afforded, in particular that much more effective access to a
solicitor was given. Every detainee should be entitled to a private
interview with a solicitor as soon as possible after detention.
Interrogation should be timed, and the detainee should be required
to endorse the written record of the length of the detention and
interrogation. A duty solicitor (an institution in which Canada has
led the way) should be available wherever possible, but the
difficulty of finding sufficient solicitors to man such a service,
especially at night and weekends, and the public expense involved
must be recognised.
29. See Eleventh Report of the Criminal Law Revision Committee: Evidence
(General) (1972, Cmnd. 4991) at 43-4 (para. 65). See Clause 2(2) of the
Committee's draft Bill (at 173, explained at 212-213).
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The present situation is unsatisfactory for the detainee because he
is alone with the police and may be induced to make a confession
which in fact is not true. It is unsatisfactory for the police because
increasingly juries are suspicious of police evidence of a confession,
and may acquit the guilty. It is unsatisfactory for the court because
of the trial within a trial problem. It is unsatisfactory for the public
because of the difficulty of ensuring that a confession is or is not
true.
One possibility to be considered is that a confession should not be
admissible unless given in the presence of a police officer of a
prescribed senior rank, e.g.a superintendent. The Committee did
not favour this course.
3 0
The most satisfactory possibility is a system of controlled
interrogation, under which no statement made by a detainee to the
police would be admissible in evidence unless made in the presence
of a magistrate. A rota of magistrates would ensure 24 hour 7 day
availability. The detainee would be entitled to have a solicitor
present, to advise generally, but the solicitor would be legally and
ethically prohibited from advising silence. The police would be
entitled to ask any questions they wished, subject to a ruling by the
magistrate; the proceedings would be recorded and admissible in
evidence at the trial, and the jury could be invited to draw an
adverse inference from refusal to answer if they wished. The right
of silence would be thus diminished, but subject to safeguards. At
the same time the alibi procedure would be extended; in other
words, there would be mutual disclosure subject to safeguards.
Previous Convictions
The admission of previous convictions increases the chance of
conviction, if those convictions are for similar offences. If they are
dissimilar, it is possible for them to have an effect that is positively
favourable to the accused. It would be better to eliminate previous
convictions altogether in view of their potentially highly prejudicial
effect. The CLRC proposed test that a witness for the prosecution
may be attacked on credibility without risk of retaliation3 ' would be
too difficult to operate in practice. The proposal to admit previous
convictions, if the act is admitted and the issue intention, but not if
the act is denied, is quite illogical. Accused charged with rape,
30. Id. at 39 (para. 58).
31. Id. at 71-85 (paras. 114-132).
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denies presence, convictions excluded; admits connection, but
pleads consent, convictions admitted. In both cases an essential
ingredient of the offence is denied and previous convictions are
irrelevant in establishing that ingredient. Previous convictions if
admitted would not be limited to those of a similar character.
Accused charged with indecent assualt on a woman - admits
accidental touching. Prosecution can give evidence of rape
conviction 12 years ago. Admissibility of previous convictions
should not depend upon the line taken by the defence. The accused
was usually present at the scene of the crime and the issue turns on
knowledge, intention and self-defence and such matters. However,
it must be recognised that the admissibility of previous convictions
is common practice in the inquisitorial procedure in civil law
jurisdictions and not contrary to the European Convention of
Human Rights.
The Law Reform Commission of Canada Evidence Project Study
Paper No. 4 did not propose the admissibility of previous
convictions as a general rule, though the possible formulation
speaks curiously of general admissibility though not in order to
prove dispositionper se. Basically the proposal codifies the existing
common law position with no substantial changes. The proposal for
general judicial discretion is most welcome: 32
Evidence relevant to the character of any person may be excluded
if, in the opinion of the judge ... its probative value is
substantially less than the likelihood of:
(a) creating unfair prejudice to any party in the proceeding, or
(b) confusing the issues to be decided, or
(c) misleading thejury .... or
(d) unduly delaying the proceeding.
The retaliation of the prosecution rule is proposed to be retained
but to be limited to character evidence of a trait relevant to the crime
charged.
Arguments for Prosecutorial Discovery ofDefence Case
The surprise element in the common law criminal trial may be
dramatic but it is hardly compatible with a desire to ascertain the
truth. Pre-trial discovery, which the principle of equality of arms
would seem to require, would enable the prosecution to adduce
rebutting evidence if discoverable and available and thus reduce the
32. Character (Ottawa: Law Reform Commission, 1972) at 1.
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risk of false evidence being given or passing unchallenged; indeed
the absence of challenge by the prosecution to evidence of the
defence disclosed before trial would strengthen the credibility of
that defence evidence because speculative challenge by the
prosecution could not be plausibly made at the trial. The defence
witness interviewed by the police, under conditions of proper
safeguard, would be unlikely to give false evidence.
Relevant Evidence
The law of evidence is "a group of disparate, ill-connected and
often unrationalised rules owing their origin to history, to common
law and to the intuition of the judges." 33 The guiding principle in
the law of evidence should be, as Professor Meyer rightly says, 34
relevance and weight rather than admissibility based on traditional
exclusionary rules. The judge should play a more active role and
should have and exercise a wide discretion to admit or reject. The
whole system must be gradually improved. Scientific evidence of
credibility, such as polygraphs, testimony given under hypnosis, the
testimony of an expert witness on credibility should be admitted
subject to appropriate safeguards. Naturally, the defence would
have to have access to appropriate scientific experts in order to
challenge such evidence, and the ordinary right of cross-
examination would naturally continue to apply.
Hearsay evidence should be admissible for both prosecution and
defence, perhaps subject to certain safeguards. Written notice and a
copy of the proposed evidence would have to be submitted to the
other side x days before the trial; no direct evidence reasonably
obtainable, derived from an apparently reputable source, contem-
poraneous or reasonably contemporaneous with the incident in
question could be permitted; there would be a warning given to the
jury, the judge would have an overriding discretion to refuse to
admit such evidence if prejudice to the accused would far outweigh
its probative value in the light of the nature of the accusation and all
relevant circumstances. Professor Sir Rupert Cross draws attention
to three cogent illustrations of inadmissible hearsay under the
present rules:35
33. Second Annual Report of the Law Reform Commission of Canada, 1972-73
(Ottawa: Information Canada, 1973) at 21.
34. P. MeyerEvidence in the Future (1973), 51 Can. B. Rev. 107 at 110.
35. Rupert Cross, A Very Wicked Animal Defends the 11th Report of the Criminal
Law Revision Committee, [1973]Crim. L.R. 329 at 340.
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• ..the statement made by the deceased victim of a rape two
hours after the incident, that it was a coloured boy who did it; the
assertions by the deceased on a charge of abortion-manslaughter
that she intended to operate upon herself and had in fact done so;
and a document signed by the deceased on a murder charge
identifying the accused as her assailant, produced in circums-
tances in which she expected to die shortly although the
expectation was not a "settled hopeless" expectation.
Weakening the legal requirement of corroboration and substitut-
ing a mandatory warning would be a retrograde step, especially
since the corroboration issue so often arises in what is really a case
of disputed identification. Where the victim of a sexual offence or a
child under 14 (preferably 16) gives evidence, that evidence should
be corroborated as a matter of law by other sworn evidence in view
of the seriousness of the matter for the accused. The corroboration
rules have developed through years of experience and cannot lightly
be jettisoned. In sex cases and in cases involving child victims, the
accused should be liable to conviction only on the basis of sworn
evidence corroborated in a material particular by other sworn
evidence, in view of the grave and well-known risk of unreliable
evidence in such cases.
Every acquittal is an injustice. Either a guilty man has escaped
conviction or an innocent man has been wrongly accused.
